TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING RESOURCE GUIDE

INTRODUCTION

The first edition of this Trade Capacity Building Resource Guide was published in 2008 as a UN system driven initiative to provide a summary of ‘who does what for whom’ at time when both donors and recipients were looking again at how aid could best assist countries to use trade as part of their development strategies.    It was obvious that the United Nations (UN) organisations, taken together, had an important role in this, but it was also clear that the large number of donors, differing in areas of interest, types of expertise, modes of working and rules on eligibility, made it difficult for an individual recipient to identify which agencies could help it on a particular project and what types of capacity building could be combined into a trade development strategy.  This edition was widely welcomed, but criticised because some international and regional agencies had not taken part, and because it was limited to the UN system.  The second edition, in 2010, added more agencies and through cooperation with the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) reached out to the twenty four bilateral programmes from DAC members (Development Co-operation Directorate of OECD).  This third edition has added more bilateral donors, with an attempt to focus on the growing importance of South-South aid.  It now includes eight members of the OECD which are not members of the DAC, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey and some additional “South-South” donors, chosen as members of the G20:  Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and  the Russian Federation.  It has also added UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) to the UN agencies.  The bilateral agencies are covered in the second volume (Volume 2: Bilateral Services), and some of the difficulties of describing their programmes in a consistent manner are discussed in the Executive Summary, Volume 2: Bilateral Services.

This chapter first presents some recent work which strongly supports the importance of technical assistance to help countries to trade and summarises the results in the two main volumes (Volume 1: Multilateral Services  and Volume 2: Bilateral Services) in order to indicate how donors respond to these needs.  It uses the typology of trade capacity building which has been used in all three editions. It then discusses new approaches to understanding how countries are integrated into world markets and the possible implications of these for the types of assistance needed.   It describes how the multilateral and regional agencies and the bilateral donors are improving how they work together and identifies some of the ways in which they are taking a South-South approach in their programmes. 

The Executive Summaries to the two main volumes (Volume 1: Multilateral Services and Volume 2: Bilateral Services) look at whether there are identifiable changes in the programmes of the agencies and bilateral donors which were already covered in the 2010 edition of the Resource Guide.  The volume on bilateral donors then discusses the donors included for the first time in more detail.  Each introduction summarises the activities of the donors by standard category.  For bilateral donors, there is also a summary of their participation in triangular aid.

Both volumes are available as CDs and on-line at www.unido.org/tcbresourceguide2013.

The importance of reducing the costs of trading

Previous editions have argued that funding for trade capacity building matters because of the importance of trade for development and have looked at the role of trade during the financial crisis.  But it is important to look also at the evidence of what obstructs trade by developing countries in order to draw conclusions on whether aid can help and, if so, what types of aid.  If the binding barriers are policy restrictions (import barriers, discrimination through regional trading areas, etc.), aid measures cannot have a major impact, and even aid to adjust to changes in policy, (the original purpose of the WTO (World Trade Organization), Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative), would have a limited role at a time when many trade negotiations are stalled.  If the most important constraints on trade are from weaknesses in production (supply side problems), then aid will have a role, but it will not necessarily be directly “trade-related” aid.  The evidence is growing, however, that the costs of trading are a significant barrier for developing countries trying to increase their participation in world markets.  To the extent that this is true, aid targeting these costs will have a significant effect on countries’ ability to use trade in their development strategies.

There are several types of new evidence on trade costs.  Work at the World Bank (Arvis et al 2013) has confirmed what has been found in a variety of regional and bilateral trade studies, that trading costs are higher for developing countries than for developed.  Worse, they found that the differential was increasing, so that the disadvantage of developing countries in trade is increasing.  The principal problems appear to be in maritime transport and logistics.  Their data, however, are limited and their discussion is at a general level.  Two very specific studies start to identify more precisely the types of cost which matter, although one is not directly based on developing countries.  A study of the effect of the introduction of containers in maritime trade among developed countries (Bernhofen et al 2013) found that it increased bilateral trade flows on average by 320%, an effect much larger than the authors (or others) could find from formation of free trade agreements or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) membership.  Looking at land transport, Bonfatti and Poelhekke (2013) have found that transport systems designed to take mining products to ports have a strong and continuing impact on the pattern of a country’s trade even in other goods because the existence of transport links creates a lasting cost differential between these routes and others.  One result, of course, is to reduce intra-regional trade, even where this would, given cost-neutral transport links, be efficient. 

A careful comparison by Moïsé and Sorescu (2013) of the relationship of trade facilitation indicators (using the definitions in current WTO negotiations) to trade performance indicates what types of changes would have the largest impact on different types of country.  For the low income and Sub-Saharan African categories, the largest impact comes from “harmonisation and simplification of documents” and/or automation of processes.  For middle income countries, it comes from “streamlining of procedures” (emphasis in original).  For land-locked countries, not surprisingly, the greatest improvement comes from reforming transit procedures and agreements.  For low income countries, more documents and more time are required to trade. They also found that the simple provision of information (ensuring that agreements and customs classifications and procedures are published on websites and easily available) differs between low income and other countries.  An important result is that the impact of “comprehensive trade facilitation reform” is greater than the sum of individual effects, because of the interaction among the different obstacles. 

These results indicate that there are areas where change is likely to have strong effects on recipients’ trade and development potential, and thus where targeted trade capacity building can have an important role.  In particular, the significance that several studies have found for transit costs identifies an area which may be neglected in programmes designed country-by-country.  Some estimates suggest that African border costs are particularly high, but there are well-known problems in other regions; for example, Brazilian food exports in 2013 have been held back by transport bottlenecks.  The detail in these and other studies of what increases the costs of trading could be used to guide priorities in trade capacity building. 

In terms of the classification used in this Guide (Table 1), some multilateral and regional donors identify Trade Facilitation and Physical Infrastructure as areas of activity but these are fewer than half the number engaged in Global Advocacy, Trade Policy Development and Legal and Regulatory Framework support (the areas which imply a view that policy matters) or Supply Capacity (relevant when internal production costs matter).  Compliance Support, which also reduces the costs of trading (see UNIDO 2011), shows only a few donors.  Among bilateral donors, the numbers offering support to Trade Facilitation and Physical Infrastructure are as high as those for the policy and supply categories.

Table 1

Overview of Trade Capacity Building Services and Initiatives

 
 

Global
Advocacy

Trade
Policy
Development

Legaland
Regulatory
Framework

Supply
Capacity

Compliance
Support
Infrastructure
and Services

Trade
Promotion
Capacity
Building

Market
&Trade
Information

Trade
Facilitation

Physical Trade
Infrastructure

Trade-related
Financial
Services

South-South
& Triangular
Cooperation

Other
Trade-related
Activities

Total

Multilateral and
regional agencies

22

21

18

21

8

4

10

12

8

7

17

8

31

DAC donors

13

21

18

24

21

15

17

19

20

22

10

7

24

Other EU donors

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

4

Other G20 donors

0

4

3

2

3

0

1

4

2

0

5

0

6

 

Adding a value chain perspective

As cross-border integration of production has extended to more commodities and more countries, trade analysis has turned more attention to looking at the whole “chain” of supply, rather than at production of specific goods or at particular stages of production.  Dividing production across borders is not new.  Both hard and soft commodities have always been partially processed in their country of production and partially in the country of consumption, sometimes with intermediate stages in other countries.  Complex commodities, whether clothing and china in the 18th century or televisions in the 20th, have been sent back and forth across borders to take advantage of cheap or alternatively of highly skilled labour or of different climates or of other differences in factors of production. .But it is probably true that a higher proportion of world trade is now involved in trading in single stages of production, and that improved communication and transport have raised awareness of, and reduced the costs of, other potential locations for production. If goods or services cross borders more than once, then reducing border costs becomes more significant. Analysis of value chains has also drawn attention to the importance of market and other types of power relationships in determining how the gains from trade are shared among the different parts of the chain.

If  trade is analysed in this way, then targeting aid to have the maximum impact requires examining all the actual and potential stages of production which could be located in a recipient country (the increasing separability of stages of production means that the number of stages to consider is constantly increasing) and identifying which chains are most in need of assistance and then where along the chain aid would be most effective, rather than looking at individual goods and services which may be traded and the costs or barriers to each of these.  Keane (2013) identifies a range of possible market failures in value chains which can be read as an agenda for aid interventions (Table 2).

Table 2: Market Failures Affecting Entry and Participation with Global Value Chains (GVCs), and Responses

Type

Examples

Responses

AfT Category

Coordination

Externalities, complementarities  ignored; linkages not exploited; no policy coherence

Capacity building for industrial policy

Trade Development; Trade Related Infrastructure; Building Productive Capacity

Technology: Developing, adapting and adopting

Incomplete and imperfect information; network externalities

Promotion of technology transfer and adoption

Trade Development and Trade Related Infrastructure

Skills formation

Externalities, imperfect information

Coordination and/or subsidies for training

Building Productive Capacity

Environment: Protection, conservation, cleaner technologies

Negative externalities not accounted for

Product and process standards and regulations

Trade Policy and Regulations

Source: Adapted from te Velde and Morrissey (2005)

Both legal and private standards can be important at every level of production.  Intervention may alter the allocation of returns within chains as well as increasing the total gains from trade.  The importance of looking at a chain, rather than at individual stages of production or products, like the finding (above) that trade facilitation improvements are more effective when taken together, suggests that approaches to trade capacity building should start from a broad view of how a country is trying to change its trade, and then an assessment of all the obstacles to this.  Clearly, individual donors with their own priorities, expertise, and, in the case of specialist agencies, legal areas of responsibility cannot be expected to provide on their own a comprehensive response to the needs identified.  This reinforces the need for coordination, not merely within individual types of assistance or individual countries, but across a programme of assistance.

Fewer than half the multilateral and regional donors mention value or supply chains in their responses to this Guide.  The ADB (Asian Development Bank) has a programme to promote regional supply chains in South Asia in agro-processing and in leather.  UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) also develops value chains in agro-processing.  UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), the ITC (International Trade Centre) and UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) have programmes for regional cotton and textile chains.  Table 3 indicates which agencies’ responses had identifiable policies or activities related to value chains. As there was not a specific question on this to donors, not mentioning supply chains does not necessarily show that the agencies do not take account of them.    

Table 3

Focus of Multilateral Agencies and Regional Development Banks: 

  Value Chain Perspectives, Sustainability and Sectoral Priorities

       
  Value Chain Perspectives

Sustainability

Sectoral Priorities

      or activities mentioned

UNDESA

     
       
ITC

x

x

 
UNCTAD

x

x

General, Tourism,Bio

UNDP

x

x

General, commodities

UNEP

x

x

Agriculture

UNCITRAL

     
UN-Habitat

  x

Rural development

UNRWA

    General

       
UNESCAP

x

x

General,textiles

UNECA

  x

General support

UNECE

  x

 
UNECLAC

x

x

General support

       
FAO

x

x

Agriculture

ICAO

  x

 
IFAD

x

x

 
ILO

x

x

General support

IMO

     
IMF

     
ITU

  x

Telecom

UNIDO

x

x

General, Agriculture,Fish

      Textiles,Clothing,Energy

WB

   x

General,Agriculture

WHO

     
WIPO

  x

 
UNWTO

  x

Tourism

       
IAEA

    Energy

WTO

     
       
AfDB

  x

General,Agriculture

ADB

    SMEs

CDB

  x

General

EBRD

  x

General, Agriculture

IDB

x

x

General

       

 

Textiles/apparel is the only industrial sector frequently mentioned by the multilateral agencies for regional value chains and South-South cooperation.  Tourism, fishing and energy are also mentioned more than once, but the supply sector most often explicitly mentioned is agriculture.   There is no indication that these priorities are based on identification of appropriate supply chains and stages of production for individual recipients, and they do not meet the need for low income countries to avoid over-dependence on simple commodity production.  The dominance of agriculture and textiles suggests a distinctly traditional view of economic activity.

Many more bilateral donors now mention value or supply chains in their responses to this Guide, but it is not clear how far this has influenced their activities.  It some cases the reference seems simply to mean encouraging production for export.  Others, like Portugal, do have integrated programmes for production and marketing which recognise the need for such an approach, but do not call this a “value chain” approach.  Table 4 indicates which bilateral donors’ responses had identifiable policies or activities in the area of value chains.  As there was not a specific question on this to donors, not mentioning them does not necessarily show that the agencies do not take account of them. 

Table 4

Focus of Bilateral Donors: 

  Value Chain Perspectives, Sustainability and Sectoral Priorities

 
  Value Chain
Perspectives

Sustainability

Sectoral Priorities or
activities mentioned

 
DAC members

Australia

x

  Agriculture,Textiles&clothing

Austria

    Agriculture,Energy,Shoes

Belgium

x

x

Agriculture,Fish

Canada

x

x

General,Agriculture,Artisan

Denmark

x

x

General,Agriculture,Industry

EC

x

  Rum,Textiles&clothing

Finland

x

x

General,Agriculture,Energy,Construction

France

x

x

Agriculture,Tourism,Finance

Germany

x

x

General,Agriculture

Greece

  x

Potatoes

Ireland

    Agriculture,Fair Trade

Italy

    Agriculture

Japan

  x

Agriculture

Korea

    General,Agriculture,Textiles&clothing

Luxembourg

    General,Rural,ITC

Netherlands

x

x

General,Agriculture

New Zealand

x

  Agriculture,Fish,Tourism

Norway

    Energy

Portugal

  x

Agriculture,Rural development,Mineral resources

Spain

x

x

Agriculture,Fish

Sweden

x

x

General

Switzerland

x

x

General

United Kingdom

x

x

General,Agriculture,Textiles&clothing

United States

x

x

General,Agriculture,Tourism

 
Other EU Member Countries

Czech

     
Estonia

     
Slovak

     
Slovenia

  x

 
 
Other Members of G20

Argentina

x

x

General,Agriculture,Fish,

      Textiles&Clothing,Tourism

Brazil

x

x

General,Agriculture

Indonesia

     
Mexico

     
Russian Fed.

    General

Turkey

     

 

Only two of the non-DAC donors mention value chains, Argentina and Brazil, and, as is true for many DAC donors, their sectoral priorities are traditional:  agriculture for both, with fish, textiles and clothing, and tourism added for Argentina.  In the case of these countries, however, in contrast to many of the DAC donors, their own economies have strong agricultural sectors and they therefore have national expertise and experience in this area to offer as donors.  The donors included in this volume do not include many of the Asian countries most active in promoting value chains; this may help explain the lack of attention to other types of chain.  Only three of the non-DAC donors mention  environmental and sustainability issues.

It remains the case, as was noted in the previous edition, that almost all the bilateral DAC donors which have sectoral priorities for assistance (20 out of 24 of the DAC donors; three out of ten of those newly included) include agriculture as one (frequently the only) area of interest.  Industry (which usually means textiles and clothing, the stereotypical developing country entry to a value chain) and services (usually tourism) trail, covered by only a third of bilateral donors.  The sectors covered by bilateral agencies thus seem even more concentrated in traditional areas than those of the multilateral and regional agencies, and there is little evidence that this is being changed in response to awareness of the importance of looking at all stages of production. 

Some of the multilateral and regional agencies have programmes in economic sectors which can promote integration in to global value chains.  These are found both under Supply Capacity activities and, notably by the Regional Commissions and Banks, under Trade Facilitation.  As was noted above, most of the activities reported are in the areas related to policy and production, rather than directed at the costs of trading. Those agencies with programmes in Physical Infrastructure are acting in the areas identified as most needed, including ports and regional roads.  In the category of Trade Facilitation, there are activities to improve the efficiency of customs operations and some directed at the problems facing land-locked countries.  The bilateral donors, both DAC and new donors, are much more active in these sectors.  They have a range of activities in the categories of Physical Infrastructure and Trade Facilitation, and in particular in road and sea transport and in customs administration.  Like the multilateral and regional agencies, many focus particularly on developing regional trading links. 

Environmental and sustainability issues for trade

In contrast to their limited attention to value chains, the responses of the multilateral and regional agencies show increasing awareness of how changes in the environment and in international regulations related to it may affect trade and trade policy, and therefore trade capacity building.  Almost all the multilateral agencies mention this (Table 3).  Some cite specific activities under Supply Capacity, while some mention this as an “other” type of support.   

For the bilateral agencies, the proportion mentioning sustainability issues (Table 4) is smaller than for the multilateral and smaller than for value chains (with the same reservation, that there was no direct question on this).  This may be because trade and environment are treated as separate responsibilities in bilateral programmes.  There is a risk that such a division will miss the important linkages between these types of support as countries must design trade strategies which will be sustainable in a changing environment.  This difference from the high number of mentions by the multilateral and regional agencies is particularly surprising in view of the emphasis on agriculture in the bilateral programmes.  

Encouraging South-South and triangular cooperation

For the first time, the questionnaires sent to both the multilateral and regional agencies and the bilateral donors tried to identify how they encourage the sharing of knowledge or experience among recipients.  Their responses are compiled separately in the relevant volumes (Volume 1: Multilateral Services and Volume 2: Bilateral Services).  Almost all the multilateral and regional agencies responded with examples (see Table 5 and the Executive Summary, Volume 1: Multilateral Services). 

Table 5

Multilateral Agencies and Regional Development Banks:
South-South Cooperation and Collaboration with other Agencies

     
  Encouragement of
South-South Partnerships

Agencies reported as partners

   
UNDESA

  UNCTAD, Regional Comissions

     
ITC

x

UNCTAD, WTO

UNCTAD

x

  ITC, UNDP,Regional Commissions, FAO,IMF, UNIDO, WB

    WIPO, WTO

UNDP

x

 
UNEP

x

ITC, UNCTAD,FAO,UNIDO, Regional Commissions,WTO

UNCITRAL

  UNCTAD, UNDP, Regional Commissions,WB, WIPO, WTO,

    EBRD, WCO

UN-Habitat

  FAO,IFAD,ILO, UNIDO

UNRWA

   
     
UNESCAP

x

UNCTAD, UNDP, UNECE, WTO, ADB,  EC

UNECA

  ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, WTO

UNECE

  UNDESA,ITC,UNCTAD,UNCITRAL, UNESCAP,UNECA,UNECLAC

     UNESCWA, FAO, IMO, ITU, WB, WTO

UNECLAC

x

Regional Commissions

     
FAO

x

UNCTAD, UNIDO, WB, WHO,WTO

ICAO

   
IFAD

x

 
ILO

x

ITC,UNCTAD, UNDP,UNIDO, WIPO, WTO

IMO

   
IMF

   UN,WB,Regional Development Banks

ITU

  UNCTAD,UNDP,UNEP, UN-Habitat,FAO, ICAO,ILO,UNIDO

    WB, WHO, WTO, IDB

UNIDO

x

 ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP,FAO, ITU, WB, IAEA, WTO

WB

x

 
WHO

x

WIPO, WTO

WIPO

x

UN

UNWTO

  UNDP, WB, WTO, ADB

IAEA

  FAO

WTO

x

UNCTAD, Regional Commissions, IMF, UNIDO, WB,

    Regional Development Banks, WCO

     
AfDB

x

UN, UNECA,WB,WTO,ADB.WCO

ADB

x

UNESCAP,WB,WTO,AfDB,IDB,WCO

CDB

  UN,IMF,WB, IDB

EBRD

  UN,UNECE,WB

IDB

x

UN, WB, WTO, ADB,WCO,

 

The agencies display a wide range of areas of cooperation, but for most the coverage is narrower than their direct activities.  It is normal for the costs of cooperation to be a barrier to joint activities:  some of the programmes are directly targeted at meeting the costs of South-South exchanges. 

Under half of the DAC donors mention triangular aid explicitly (Table 6), but this includes many of the larger donors.  A few of the others indicate that they are considering introducing it.  The Russian Federation and all the developing countries included in this Guide are active in it.  Examples of triangular aid are given in the Executive Summary to Volume 2, Bilateral Services. 

Coordination among agencies

The lack of cross-agency coordination and its desirability have been themes of development literature for at least 30 years, since increasing numbers of agencies have become active.  The difficulties and costs of coordination are, however, high.  This is not only because agencies have different methods of working and areas of interest, but because they may have different objectives and different views on the appropriate strategies for trade and trade capacity building.  For recipient countries, the costs of administering a large number of overlapping programmes are high, but so also are the costs of facing a limited number of potential donors. 

The multilateral and regional agencies are increasingly emphasising their cooperation among each other, and there are a number of formal coordination mechanisms, some of which are described in the second section (Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanisms) of Volume 1, Multilateral Services.  There is also the UN’s “Delivering as One” initiative, mentioned by UNCTAD, the UNWTO (World Tourism Organization), and the regional commissions.  Table 5 indicates the partnerships they listed with other agencies or donors.  Only agencies and countries included in this Guide are listed here as partner agencies, although some mentioned other partners.  The only, exceptional, addition is the World Customs Organisation (WCO), included because it is a major institution in trade and received a number of mentions.

The multilateral agencies which were most often mentioned by other multilateral or regional agencies were the WTO, the UN regional commissions, UNCTAD, the regional development banks, and the World Bank (The regional commissions and development banks are each treated as groups in this analysis.).  But even these were mentioned by fewer than half the others.  At the next level are UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNIDO, the ITC (international Trade Centre), and the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), mentioned by around a quarter; the other had fewer mentions.   Most of the multilateral and regional agencies mentioned at least five other agencies as partners, the exceptions being UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs), ITC, UNDP, IMF (International Monetary Fund), World Bank, UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), UNECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), and EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and some of the specialised agencies such as UN-HABITAT (UN Human Settlements Programme), FAO, IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), WHO (World Health Organization), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization), and IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).    Among other agencies, not covered in this Volume, there were five mentions of the WCO by the multilateral and regional agencies (and one by a bilateral donor, the United States of America (US)).  The bilateral donors which were frequently mentioned as partners included Canada, the EU (European Union), Japan, Korea (Republic of), Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US.

The examples given by each agency are probably incomplete and reflect different types of collaboration, and some of the agencies may have considered that mentioning formal coordination mechanisms such as CEB (Chief Executives’ Board for Coordination) covered their partnerships.  It would therefore be wrong to attach too much weight to the differences here.   The pattern suggested is that there are overlapping groups which work together, especially at regional level.

The bilateral donors were also asked for this information.   Most mentioned fewer partners than the multilateral agencies (Table 6).  Only some of the DAC agencies explicitly mention cooperation which goes beyond funding with the multilateral and regional agencies, although descriptions of individual activities reveal that others have such arrangements (Table 6 includes both those mentioning such collaboration in their general descriptions and those giving examples for individual activities.  It is not always clear if this is cooperation or just funding).  The WTO is by far the most often mentioned (twelve references), followed by the World Bank, UNIDO and ITC (nine).  The regional development banks taken together are at a similar level, followed by UNDP and UNCTAD.   There were no mentions for the regional commissions.

Table 6

Bilateral Donors: 

 
  Participation in Triangular Cooperation
and Partner Agencies

Aid and Partner Agencies

 
  Participation in

Triangular cooperation

Agencies reported as partners

 
DAC Members

Australia

  ITC, WB,WIPO,WTO, ADB

Austria

  UNIDO,WB, WTO

Belgium

  WB

Canada

   ITC,WTO

Denmark

x

WTO

EC

  ITC, ILO, WTO    

Finland

   
France

  ITC,UNIDO, WTO, Regional Development Banks

Germany

x

 UNCTAD, WTO

Greece

   
Ireland

  ITC, UNCTAD, WB, WTO

Italy

  WIPO, WTO,AfDB

Japan

x

WB,WTO,WIPO,AfDB,ADB

Korea

  IDB

Luxembourg

   
Netherlands

  UN, WB,WTO

New Zealand

x

UNDP, WB,ADB,

Norway

  ITC,UNCTAD, UNIDO, WTO, WCO

Portugal

  UNIDO

Spain

x

UNIDO

Sweden

x

 
Switzerland

x

ITC,UNCTAD, ILO, UNIDO, EBRD

United Kingdom

x

ITC, WB

United States

x

ITC,WB,FAO,IFAD,IDB,WCO

 
Other EU Member Countries

Czech

no

 
Estonia

no

 
Slovak

no

 
Slovenia

no

UNIDO

 
Other members of the G20

Argentina

x

FAO

Brazil

x

UNDP, FAO,ILO,UNIDO, WHO,WIPO,AfDB, IDB

Indonesia

x

UNDP,FAO

Mexico

x

 
Russian Fed.

x

UNDP, UNIDO

Turkey

no

UNDP

France reports on extensive cooperation in Africa with the AfDB (African Development Bank) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa.  Germany also mentions various types of cooperation, and a high proportion of Ireland’s activities are in cooperation with or through multilateral agencies.  Japan mentions cooperation with the World Bank, ADB (asian Development Bank), AfDB, WTO and WIPOKorea (Republic of) has a policy of using multilaterals to manage the increase in its aid, intending to channel 30% of its aid in this way.  The United Kingdom conducts reviews of the effectiveness of multilateral and regional agencies in meeting UK development objectives, and restricts its collaboration to those which share its views.  The US collaborates with ITC on market development and with various agencies on agriculture, as well as with the WCO.  Portugal mentions collaboration on training with UNIDO.  Other examples are covered in the sections on activities in the detailed Volumes 1 and 2.

Although some new donors (both developed and developing countries) say that they prefer to act through multilateral and regional agencies because of inexperience with aid in general or trade-related aid in particular, only some of them list such agencies as partners in this Guide.  This may be because the others are funding such agencies, but not working with them.  This would suggest that they do not intend to acquire experience and then shift to direct funding, but rather plan to continue to delegate this type of assistance to the agencies.  Argentina works with FAO, and also with two agencies not described in this Guide, UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund) and UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services).  Brazil mentions UNDP, ILO (International Labour Organization), WIPO, FAO and the WHO, and is additionally mentioned by the AfDBTurkey has a joint programme with UNDP to promote private sector development.  Information from the agencies indicates that China has agreements with UNDP, FAO, IDB, ADB, and UNIDO.  (China did not respond to requests for information.)  China has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the WTO under the WTO’s Aid for Trade initiative to help LDCs to accede to the WTO and strengthen their participation in it (WTO, 2012).  The Russian Federation mentions UNIDO, IMF and UNDP; Indonesia mentions the FAO and UNDP;  Brazil, India and South Africa are mentioned by the ILO as partners.   Mexico reports that it works with multilateral partners.  Slovenia has an agreement with UNIDO.  These countries may be using the partnerships to gain experience or because they think that they can already offer useful expertise.

References

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